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Summary findings
In developing the architecture j:or a financial system, the  assumes that the final outcome will resemble the market
challenge is to combine deregulation and safety nets  solution - not because that is the optimal policy choice
against systemic failure with efi'ective  prudential  but because of how political weaknesses will interact
regulation and oversight.  with advances in settlement technology.
Klein analyzes three approaches to choosing an  In Klein's scenario, the world moves towa  id a
adequate regulatory framework for a financial system.  monetary system in which fixed exchange ra,le systems or
* Those most worried about panic and herd behavio:r  de facto currency competition limit the pow. r af central
tend to favor relatively extensive controls on financial  banks. This limits options for discretionary a id open-
institutions' activities, including controls on interest rates  ended liquidity support to help deal with sysr  ernic
and on the volume and direction of lending.  financial crises.
* Those most concerned about moral hazard advocate  The costs of inflexible exchange rates are imoderated
abolishing controls and safety nets, seeing the solution in  by new types of wage contracts, using units of a.ccount
stronger market discipline and ieduced powers and  that are correlated with the shocks a particular  industry
discretion for regulators.  or kind of contract faces - thus maintaining the positive
* Mainstream opinion advocates a mix of measures,  aspects of monetary systems  with flexible nomrinal
to both strengthen market discipline and improve  exchange rates.
regulatory oversight.  Mistrust in monetary authorities  and the eraergence of
The approach a country opts for depends on (1) which  private settlement systems lead to a return of asset-
monetary and exchange rate regime it chooses, (2)  backed money as the means of payment.
whether  it is more concerned about moral hazard or  The disciplines on financial systems come to riesemble
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Arguably the key challenge for financial system architecture is to combine deregulation
as well as safety nets against systemic failure with effective prudential regulation and oversight
of actors in financial systems.  Possible approaches depend in turn on the choice of monetary and
exchange rate regime, in which financial systems are embedded.  This paper sets out three
approaches to deal with key dilemmas facing policy-makers in choosing an adequate regulatory
framework and creates a scenario for the development of the global financial system over the
next two or three decades, which assumes that the actual outcome will resemble the market
solution.
The author  is Chief Economist  of Shell  International.  Views  expressed  in this paper are the author's and do not
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Arguably the key challenge for financial system architecture is to combine deregulation
as well as safety nets against systemic failure with effective prudential regulation and oversight
of actors in financial systems. Possible approaches depend in turn on the choice of monetary and
exchange rate regime, in which financial systems are embedded.
The first part of this paper sets out three approaches to deal with key dilemmas facing
policy-makers in choosing an adequate regulatory framework. Those most worried about herd
behaviour and panic tend to favour relatively extensive controls on the activities of financial
institutions, including on interest rates and on the volume and direction of lending.  Those most
concerned about moral hazard advocate the abolition of controls and safety nets.  They see the
solution in stronger market discipline and reduced powers and discretion for regulators.  The
mainstream of opinion advocates a mix of measures that strengthens both market discipline and
improves regulatory oversight.  Which of these approaches will tum out to be adopted in the end
remains uncertain, because it is neither clear whether concerns about moral hazard or about herd
behaviour and panic are fundamentally more important, nor is it clear how the politics of reform
will shape solutions.
The second part of the paper creates a scenario for the development of the global
financial system over the next two or three decades, which assumes that the actual outcome will
resemble the market solution. The final outcome is not the result of optimal policy choice but of
the interaction of political weaknesses with advances in settlement technology.  In the scenario
the world moves towards a monetary system where fixed exchange rate systems or de facto
currency competition limit the powers of central banks.  This limits options for discretionary and
open-ended liquidity support to help deal with systemic financial crises.  The costs of inflexible
exchange rates are moderated by new types of wage contracts using units of account that are
correlated with the shocks facing a particular firm or industry thus maintaining the positive
aspects of monetary systems with flexible nominal exchange rates. Mistrust in monetary
authorities and the emergence of private settlement systems lead to a return of asset-backed
money used as the means of payment. The disciplines on financial systems come to resemble a
bit those of historical "free banking" systems with financial institutions requiring high levels of
equity and payments systems protected only by limited, fully-funded safety nets."MONEY,  POLITICS  AND A FUTURE FOR  THE  INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM"
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INTRODUCTION
Flexible financial markets appear to stimulate growth (Levine, Loayza and Beck, 1998).
They help allocate existing resources to their most efficient uses.  Most importantly they help
fund competing experiments and innovations and ultimately select the most successful among
them.  World-wide there is now a trend towards deregulation and liberalisation of financial
markets.  However, deregulated financial markets can exhibit severe volatility and disrupt
economic activity as exemplified by the recent emerging market crises originating in East Asia,
partly as a result of herd behaviour and panic.  Some of the policy innovations of the 20th century
have been aimed at creating safety nets against systemic failure in financial systems such as
deposit insurance and liquidity support. However, the safety nets themselves also unavoidably
create incentives for excessive risk-taking (moral hazard).  The key challenge for financial
system management is thus to combine deregulation and safety nets against systemic failure with
effective prudential regulation and oversight of actors in financial systems.  Possible approaches
depend in turn on the choice of monetary and exchange rate regime, in which financial systems
are embedded.  For example, fixed exchange rate systems such as currency boards limit the
ability of the monetary authority to provide deposit insurance or liquidity support.
The first part of this essay sets out the key dilemmas facing policy-makers in choosing an
adequate regulatory framework, within which financial markets can decentralise allocation
decisions efficiently while containing systemic risks. Broadly, three approaches exist to deal
with the dilemmas.  Those most worried about herd behaviour and panic tend to favour relatively
extensive controls on the activities of financial institutions, including on interest rates and on the
volume and direction of lending.  Those most concerned ab.out  moral hazard advocate the
abolition of controls and safety nets.  They see the solution in stronger market discipline and
reduced powers and discretion for regulators.  The mainstream of opinion advocates a mix of
measures that strengthens both market discipline and improves regulatory oversight. Which of
these approaches will turn out to be adopted in the end remains uncertain, because it is neither
clear whether concerns about moral hazard or about herd behaviour and panic are fundamentally
more important, nor is it clear how the politics of reform will shape solutions.
The second part of the essay creates a scenario for the development of the global
financial system over the next two or three decades, which assumes that the actual outcome will
resemble the market solution, where regulators exercise few powers and have very limited
discretion.  The final outcome is not the result of optimal policy choice but of the interaction of
political weaknesses with advances in settlement technology.
The paper could not have  been written  without  the valuable  comments  of Ignacio  Mas. It has also  benefited  from
comments  by Constantijn  Claessens  and Daniela  Klingebiel.2  Money, Politics and a Future for  the International Financial System
The scenario has three main drivers.  One is the politics of international safety nets and
corresponding regulatory systems. Nation states are assumed to shy away from rescuing other
countries.  Countries with ailing financial systems are in turn unwilling to allow effective cross-
border supervision to contain moral hazard problems.  Second, it is assumed that efforts to make
central banks independent do not effectively insulate monetary authorities from political pressure
in times of real crisis.  As monetary authorities issuing fiat money fall prey to the temptation to
use their powers to impose some level of inflation tax they face the third scenario driver i.e. the
introduction of low cost electronic settlement technology world-wide.  This gives even poor
individuals with limited financial wealth a choice of capital flight and thus effectively renders
monetary authorities small players in a large world market without the ability to impose inflation
tax.
In the scenario the i:hree drivers move the world towards a monetary system where fixed
exchange rate systems provide commitment (an anchor) to price stability.  This limits options for
discretionary and open-ended liquidity support to help deal with systemic financial crises.  The
costs of inflexible exchange rates are moderated by new types of wage contracts using units of
account that are correlated with the shocks facing a particular firm or industry thus maintaining
the positive aspects of monetary systems with flexible nominal exchange rates.  Effectively,
national currencies are less and less used as the unit of account for many contracts.  Mistrust in
monetary authorities leads to a return of asset-backed money used as the means of payment.  The
disciplines on financial systems come to resemble a bit those of the Scottish free banking system
of the 1 8th and early 19th century with financial institutions requiring high levels of equity and
payments systemns  protected only by limited, fully-funded safety nets.
PART A:FINANCIAL SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE  - THE DILEMMA  OF THIE  EcoNoMic
CONSTITUTION
I.  Financial system architecture - an economic constitution
Financial systems aInd  the distribution of wealth.  In capitalism, the financial system is
the functional equivalent oF  central planning.  Financial decision-makers provide and with: raw
capital.  They decide what gets done and what does not.  A good financial system allocates
resources to the highest return activities and allocates risks to those best able to bear or maiiage
them.  Financial decision-makers are also key forces behind the distribution of wealth and
misery.  Some financial decision-makers are top managers in corporations.  Some work in
financial institutions and some in government.  Some invest their own savings.  Most invest
those of other people.
The opportunities open to financial decision-makers and the risks they face are a fuiiction
not only of the things that are physically possible, but importantly a finction of the rules th ey
operate under, the discretion they have and their power to change or evade the rules.  Diffe:ing
somewhat from society to society these rules prominently feature the system of property ri ,hts
including bankruptcy rules, the balance of competitiorn  and regulation in the financial markets
and the ultimate recourse to support by taxpayers or captive consumers in the event bad3  Money, Politics and a Future for  the International Financial System
investment are made.  This latter point renders the rules governing product markets an integral
part for understanding the functioning of the financial system.
Financial system architecture - an economic constitution.  The current debate about a
"new global financial architecture" is, therefore, about rules affecting who wins and who loses in
the future. The rules and regulations affect the two sides of financial transactions, the flow of
information from borrower to lender, say about creditworthiness, and the flow of funds from
lender to borrower.  Disclosure rules are examples of the former; capital controls one of the
latter. The institutions administering the rules and regulations are designed so as to combine a de
facto desired mix of autonomy and accountability.  Setting those rules and establishing the
institutions is like writing the economic constitution of a country. Like with any constitution,
there are the issues of how the new constitution is designed and of who supervises
implementation raising in turn the age-old problem of who guards the guardians.  Right from the
start we know, therefore, that there is no tidy technocratic solution to developing new global
financial infrastructure. There are no solutions, only re-solutions. The issue is how political
forces will arrive at some compromise -by design or by default -that de facto yields the new
architecture.
1I.  Changes  in monetary  and financial  systems  during  the  20th century
Given the immense implications for the distribution of wealth we might expect that new
monetary and financial regimes are hard to design and agree upon.  This might suggest little
change of basic systems over time.  However, major change has occurred throughout the 20h
century. 1
Domestic monetary andfinancial  systems.  Following early developments in the 19th
century, the 20th century saw the rise of the state-owned central bank as monopoly issuer of
domestic currency throughout the world.  Currency backing by assets with a market value such
as gold or silver was abandoned in favour of fiat money with nothing but the credibility of the
central bank behind it.  Systems of lender of last resort and deposit insurance were introduced
around the globe, notably following the Great Depression of the 1930s. Safety nets backed by
fiat money issuing central banks became the underpinning of banking systems everywhere.
Bank regulation systems came into being to help protect depositors and control exploitation of
the safety net by banks and investors.
Exchange rate regimes.  The life span of global monetary regimes that governed the
exchange rates established between domestic fiat currencies has not exceeded 30 years in the 2 0th
century.  Following the gold standard the chaotic global financial system arising out of the inter
war period ended with the establishment of the Bretton Woods system at the end of World War
II.  The Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates broke apart in 1971, although the
system's main global financial institutions, IMF and World Bank continued.  Now we are almost
30 years into a world monetary system relying heavily on flexible exchange rates and history
suggests we may be sliding into a new system.
'For  a survey of the history of financial and monetary regimes see Caprio and Vittas (1997), Eichengreen (1998)
and Cameron (1989).4  Money, Politics and a Futvre for the International Financial System
Deregulation and'  liberalisation.  In the post-war years many countries used detailed
controls on banks including limits on interest rates, credit limits, targets for lending to specific
sectors etc. Equally most countries tried to enhance monetary autonomy using controls on cross-
border capital flows. Many OECD countries still used exchange controls in crisis management
mode well into the 1970s (Shafer, 1992). Yet, as world trade was liberalised and expanded, it
became harder to enforce controls on capital flows. Trade liberalisation led to greater and greater
leakage of capital account transactions.  Likewise, banking controls came under pressure.
Advances in payment techmology  helped undermine controls.  The growing Euromarket of the
1960s undermined interest rate controls in the United States. Some countries undertook
deregulation and liberalisation out of conviction as well as necessity.  Most just could not resist
the forces of liberalisatiorL  - a bit like with telecommunications deregulation.  Today even those
countries, which maintain exchange controls, are de facto fairly open to cross-border capital
flows (Montiel, 1994).
III.  Outcomes and issues
What did the monetary and financial innovations of the 20th century result in?
*  The rise offiat  money. For fiat money the marginal benefit from issuing money greatly
exceeds the cost.  lMoney  issue leading to no more than a stable price level already
provides the monetary authorities with significant monopoly rents, namely seigneorage
typically amounting to some 0.4 of GDP annually in the major OECD economies (BIS,
1996). Beyond this, fiat money provides issuers with strong incentives to impose
inflation tax on citizens.  Unsurprisingly then, the second half of the 20th century saw
historically unprecedented inflation. This was far in excess of history's  greatest previous
inflationary episode, the about I to 2 per cent annual inflation rate registered at the time
of the great inflow of gold into Spain and Portugal in the 16th century (Cameron, 1989).
During the current century, many countries routinely imposed inflation tax in the circLer  of
3-4 per cent of GDP every year (Fischer, 1988). Excessive inflation either led to ca lital
flight circumscribing the ability of monetary authorities to impose inflation tax or,
alternatively, central banks were given anti-inflationary mandates.  The time of the
central bank ostensibly supporting economic development actively has come to an end in
the 1980s. The timne  of central bank "independence" is there.  During the 1990s, iII
several cases countries have given up on an independent currency altogether by ch m  sing
either a currency board or currency union.
*  Lender of last resort and underlying micro-economicflexibility.  Lender of last r  sort
functions, i.e. the provision of liquidity in times of distress can be very valuable.  lleally,
a lender of last resort provides liquidity to the financial system without bailing out
insolvent banks or firms.  The benefits of a lender of last resort have again been
exemplified by the Federal Reserve's liquidity provision in the fall of 1998. The Llnited
States' monetary authority remains a large credible player in the global market for inoney
and capital flight does not offset its actions.
However, many mcinetary authorities in today's  world are losing the power to perfornm
the lender of last resort function effectively, because citizens do not trust them anymore
and have the option.  of capital flight.  Legal or de facto liberalisation of cross-border5  Money, Politics and a Future for the International Financial System
financial transactions makes the small central banks truly small players in a large world
market for money, where they are just one of several partially competing issuers of
money.  For example, many Latin American monetary authorities appear incapable of
using monetary policy to provide liquidity in tough times.  Instead of reducing domestic
interest rates the issue of liquidity often simply results in offsetting or even destabilising
exchange rate depreciation (Hausmann et al. 1999). This loss of credibility appears to be
the result of past mistakes made by central banks and their political masters.  It is thus
becoming clearer that an effective lender of last resort in open capital markets must either
be a large player and/or very carefully maintain trust.
In addition to maintaining credibility the ability of a lender of last resort to provide
lasting liquidity support depends on a sound underlying financial system.  For example,
the Bank of Japan experiences difficulties with providing liquidity to the economy at
large despite rapid expansion of central bank credit, because micro-economic rigidities
prevent workout of bad debts in banking systems.  Banks consequently become unable to
expand credit even when the central bank provides ample refinance facilities.  Until very
recently troubled banks shied away from any new lending trusting not even each others'
financial position thus de facto drying up the inter bank market.  A reasonably robust and
flexible financial system is required to enable a lender of last resort to function.  This
depends on effective systems for corporate governance and bankruptcy in particular,
which in turn are helped when product and factor markets more generally adjust well.
*  Wider safety nets and bigger banking  crises. The immediate post-war period was
characterised by severe controls on banks and by minimal risk-taking.  Yet, with
liberalisation the last few decades have seen an increasing number of banking crises
affecting some 70 countries. Crises have hit advanced countries like the United States
(saving and loans crisis 1984-91) and several Skandinavian economies (in the early
1990s) as well as developing countries across all continents.  Several countries have
experienced repeated crises, for example Argentina, Mexico and Venezuela.  The cost of
bailouts has ranged between a few per cent of GDP, for example about 3 per cent in the
United States and some 50 per cent of GDP in Argentina (Caprio and Klingebiel, 1996).
In the United States during the saving and loan crisis, the losses per dollar of deposit
were larger than during the great depression (White, 1997).  Typically taxpayers have
assumed a major share of the liabilities of failed banks.  Recent studies suggest that the
existence of deposit insurance aggravates financial crises (Demigurc-Kunt and
Detragiache, 1997). The picture is one of wider safety nets and greater deregulation
succeeded by deeper banking crises.
The great number of bank failures observed in the US historically, does not invalidate the
picture of rising severity of banking crises.  The traditional US banking failures were
rarely of systemic significance and more a function of the unit bank system, which
produced tens of thousands of small undiversified and vulnerable banks.  During the
Great Depression, for example, large numbers of banks collapsed in the United States,
but no significant bank in Canada, where banks were able to diversify their assets (Bordo,
1997).6  Money, Politics and a Futurefor  the International Financial System
The overall result.  The financial and monetary innovations of the 20th century have
enabled much greater sophistication in financial markets.  Deeper and better functioning
financial markets have stimnulated  economic growth (Levine, Loayza and Beck, 1998). The 20th
century innovations have also provided the instruments to cushion the blow to depositors from
banking crises.  They have created the possibility to counteract recession and business collapse
with liquidity provision by monetary authorities. Yet, the abuse of the monopoly over currency
issue by many states has led to unprecedented collection of inflation tax compared to previous
centuries.  Powerful investors and politicians in many countries have been encouraged to expand
risk-taking and self-dealing supported by various safety nets to the point that financial crises
have become more frequent.  The result is that more and more taxpayers throughout the world
are at risk of being forced to pay several percentage points of GDP every so often to bail out the
financial system and selected corporations, not to speak of funding plain corrupt practices.
IV.  In search of (re-) solutions
Mainstream solution - market-oriented, independent regulation.
The mainstream response to the current state of affairs is to enhance elements of market
discipline in the financial system, to improve the independence of central banks and to
strengthen regulation to control abuse, while maintaining basic systems of deposit insurance and
lender of last resort.  Innovative proposals include increasing capital requirements, increasing
managers' and shareholdets'  liability, using arms-length subordinated debt to instil better
monitoring for banks, requiring assets of banks benefiting from deposit insurance to be invested
in high-quality paper and so on. Regulators are to become "more concerned, skilled and
watchful" through better training and better institutional arrangements providing adequate
incentives and political independence (Caprio and Honahan, forthcoming).  Yet, the very nature
of banking poses dilemmas for the mainstream approach, which may reveal it to be ineffective in
many cases.  To see this, consider the "dilemma of regulation." 2
Deposit insurance and the lender of last resort systems are meant to prevent bankinir
crises from leading to failure of the payment system and consequent bankruptcies of solver.t but
illiquid firms. 3 Yet, they weaken the incentives of banks and depositors to be prudent.  For
banks, which consequently maintain much lower levels of capital than other corporations, }lelurns
can be increased by pursuing riskier lending, while downsides are limited to some degree,
particularly for those "too big to fail".  Suppose bank owners have low true capital (excluding
borrowed capital) amounting to, say 2 per cent of the balance sheet. It then pays them to go play
single numbers roulette, where the chance of winning is 1 in 35, whereas the chance of loo ing
their own money is only 1 in 50.
To prevent banks from engaging in reckless or corrupt lending practices and exploiKling
the possibilities of bailouts, prudential regulations are to be followed by banks.  Bank supe, vi sors
2 Caprio and Honahan (forthcornng)  as well as Mas (1995) describe in detail the intrinsic dilenmmas  that arise ir.
regulating banks.
3 These are externalities of bank l^ailures,  i.e. a type of failure of pure markets to achieve optimal results.7  Money, Politics and a Future for the International Financial System
are to monitor adherence and take action to prevent and manage crises. However, regulatory
systems have very often been unable to prevent banking crises or to take prompt corrective
action.  This applies to sophisticated countries like the United States, to countries with a high
degree of political integrity like the Scandinavian ones and to those characterised by cronyism.
The fundamental reason for failures of regulation lies in the very nature of banks.  Banks
specialise in assessing creditworthiness of borrowers, about which information is not widely
available, for example small firms, for which it is not cost-effective to create a transparent
information base that can be used by the capital markets to value the debt of such firms.  Banks
thus specialise in gathering and evaluation of information that is hard for others, for example
depositors, to assess.  Regulators stand a better chance to assess such information than small
depositors do.  However, even regulators face a tough time and they have worse incentives to
monitor banks well than depositors or other creditors. As bank loans are not traded in liquid
markets, there is no clear way of valuing them and consequently also no simple way to ascertain
how much true capital banks have.  The value of bank assets can change rapidly particularly
where derivatives are involved.  In times of crises asset quality can deteriorate very quickly.
Short of managing a bank themselves, regulators will not be able to value the loans of a bank
correctly. Such detailed interference would, however, undermine private owners' responsibility
and render regulators responsible for the profits and losses of those they are to supervise.
"Simply" assessing capital adequacy properly is already equivalent to assessing the market value
of the loan portfolio.
When problems arise, owners and managers of banks have extra incentives to hide them
and regulators typically face strong political pressure not to interfere. Interference exposes
regulators to accusations of misjudgement with consequent large liability implications.  The
typical result is "regulatory forbearance" as practised most recently in Japan.  In the United
States it took the better part of a decade to settle the saving and loan debacle. A good mix of
regulation and market discipline exercised by bank depositors and other creditors can contain
financial cnrses (Demigurc-Kunt and Detragiache, 1997). However, politically this is very hard
to achieve for most countries.
Alternative  solution - return to controls.
The unavoidable difficulties of regulating banks have led some to seek refuge in the use
of blunt controls.  Countries like Malaysia and Russia have re-imposed exchange controls.
China and India have been praised for going slow on liberalisation. Controls on foreign
exchange inflows have become fashionable again.  Some observers recommend relatively simple
regulatory constraints that are to prevent banks from indulging in excessive risk-taking in the
first place.  These include ceilings on deposit rates to prevent "reckless" competition among
banks and "speed limits" on the growth of bank balance sheets or loans to boom-bust sectors like
real estate (Honahan and Stiglitz, 1999).
However, the forces that led countries to deregulate in the first place, in particular
advances in information and telecommunication technology are strengthening, if anything.
Controls are thus harder to enforce and more likely to create inefficient arbitrage opportunities.
Blunt controls, administered by regulators, also risk aggravating problems of mismanagement
and corruption.  They can result in major wealth redistribution to the powerful classes, which8  Money, Politics and a Futture  for  the International Financial System
exercise control.  Some recommend the use of blunt controls for countries, where weak
regulatory competence renders more sophisticated regulatory approaches impractical.  These are,
however, precisely the countries most likely to be prone to abuse of controls, even if the controls
are designed as well as possible and meant to be used only "intermittently" to prevent crisis.  The
abandonment of market forces places more demands on political checks and balances to keep
regulators at arms-length from political pressure, while not exempting them from accountability.
Incentives for regulators have to be grounded even more in their public-spiritedness.  These pre-
conditions for the success of controls are likely to be rare.
More fundamentally, economic growth is requiring more flexible rather than rigid
financial systems.  The return to control may be adopted by some countries, but may well retard
their economic progress in the longer run. Modem growth theory emphasises that human
intelligence is the key factor of production, which acts by recombining things ("building blocks")
that always were on earth into new useful products and services (new "building blocks") (Romer,
1993). As the number ol building blocks rises the number of potential experiments explodes. 4 A
key challenge for successful societies is thus to maintain systems that decide, which experiments
are funded, which ones are not and which ones are cut short. Central planning has clearly failed
at this.  Venture capital as practised in Silicon Valley would appear to embody the essence of
required financial systems of the future, while blunt financial controls would seem to reduce the
likelihood of continued and widespread innovation.  Societies with more flexible financial
markets would thus probably be more successful and evolutionary forces would continue to
reduce the importance of rigid financial controls even if some governments pursue them.
Alternative  solution - market discipline without safety nets.
Another school of thought seeks refuge in laissez faire financial systems.'  The frc e
banking systems of the past, where safety nets did not exist and money could be issued b,i
anybody, provide the modLel,  most prominently the Scottish free banking system (Kroszn r,
1997). It lasted well over a century from the beginnings of the 18th to the middle of the I )'11
century.  It illustrates both the disciplines on private financial institutions and the success that an
economy could achieve under such a system.  Banks maintained very high levels of capital, in
the order of 30 per cent of more. Depositors were careful where to invest and banks advert.sed
with detailed information about their financial strength. Bank owners were personally lial:le in
case of bank failure.  While banking crises occurred they tended to be in the nature of any other
corporate bankruptcy and not produce systemic trouble.  Both the Scotland of that time ard the
United States of the 19th  century, where "wildcat" banking flourished, were the miracle
economies of their time.
The problem with laissez faire proposals is, of course, the reluctance to give up some. of
the achievements of 2 0th century financial architecture, namely deposit insurance and the  enider
of last resort.  Yet proponents of a laissez faire system argue that the functions of deposit
insurance and lender of last resort can be fulfilled within the framework of market discipl  ine.
4 In the sirnplest version of thinking about this, the number of permutations of building blocks indicates the number
of possible experimnents.  Just sixteen building blocks can be arranged in over 20 trillion ways.
' A guide to libertarian views on money can be found at www.ex.ac.uk/-Rdavies/arian/libertarian.html.9  Money, Politics and a Futurefor  the International Financial System
For example, recent studies suggest that at least some exposure of depositors to loss in case of
bank runs is actually beneficial as it improves incentives to monitor banks (Baer and Klingebiel,
1995). In any case deposit insurance can be funded from premia charged to depositors.  Lender
of last resort systems need not be funded by central banks.  They can in principle be provided by
funded liquidity insurance schemes. Also, when private parties issue money, they have an
incentive to provide liquidity in times of a credit crunch, because for them money is debt and
during a credit crunch they can issue cheap debt to solvent but illiquid firms.  There is no reason
in principle, why they should be less informed or capable to achieve this than a central bank.
However, financial crises are not excluded in a free market system. When a crisis hits
and hurts, governments will be under pressure to support citizens and powerful interest groups.
No matter how seriously governments may prior to the crisis announce that they will not bail out
anybody, in the midst of then crisis they will all too often be forced to reverse their policy stance.
Time and again governments have bailed out private parties, who were not formally eligible.
Private parties in turn anticipate this correctly and take excessive risk, which market forces were
supposed to prevent.  The inability of governments to commit themselves not to do anything
beyond using pre-funded insurance schemes during a major crisis tends to render pure laissez
faire hard to implement in today's political systems (Mas, 1995).
Even more fundamentally, a well-functioning market requires some level of trust among
participants in the sanctity of contracts and property rights combined with institutions capable of
sorting out disputes on these matters, reasonably well.  Any market thus raises the fundamental
dilemma of the economic constitution, i.e. how are sound rules established and who guards the
guardians of those rules.  Market forces can play an essential role as part of a system of checks
and balances and lower the demands for benevolence and efficiency on the part of politicians and
regulators.  Interest in beneficial trade among merchants or states can provide incentives to form
sensible institutions underpinning markets.  However, some reasonable social institutions
whether we call them government or self-regulatory bodies are required in the first place.
PART B:  A STORY OF  THE FUTuRE:  NATIONS STATES, E-MoNEY  AND
CURRENCY  CHOICE
It is thus understandable, why the mainstream solution to financial sector reform may be
the best we can hope for - with all its problems.  But the future has a way of surprising us.  The
fundamental dilemma of the economic constitution, and the part of bank regulation in it, suggests
that there are no unambiguous ways to predict the shape the next re-solution of the issue will
take.  In the following an unconventional view of what may happen is described, closer to the
laissez faire story, but with a twist that helps deal with the government's commitment problem.
I.  Failure of mainstream reform
To start with it is painfully obvious that all the good recommendations for domestic
financial sector reforn  made by the mainstream school are seldom implemented.  In the most
comprehensive study of the topic the World Bank examined financial sector reforms undertaken
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were judged clearly successful in only 6 of those cases (Caprio and Klingebiel, 1997). 28 cases
were judged partially successful and 30 were classified as failures or unresolved.  Without some
form of crisis, there is harcdly  any hope for serious reform.  The reason is obvious from the
preceding discussion.  The sticky points in financial sector reform are about allocating gains and
losses and enforcing this system. Typically influential people are affected. Thorough reform is
just too hard politically in imost  cases, essentially because some of the bad guys may be in
charge.
Arguably, the most thorough financial sector reforms were implemented in Chile and
Argentina (Calomiris, 199'7). Both countries did so following major crises, Chile in the early
1980s, Argentina almost a decade later.  Both cases illustrate that for successful financial sector
reform, crisis needs to come together with the political will and the ability to tie the hands of
powerful people.
II.  Importing credibility
Several nations have tied the hands of powerful people and imported policy credibility
from a foreign nation by establishing currency boards, for example Argentina. 6 Under such a
system the monetary authority of Argentina, the currency board, has hardly any power left to
affect domestic monetary aggregates.  The money supply rises, when foreign exchange flows
into the country, and falls, when there are outflows.  The currency is thus fully backed by an
asset, the US dollar, outside the control of the Argentine authorities.  Fiat money, where the
marginal benefits of printing money exceed the marginal cost and thus provide an incentive to
inflate the currency, no longer exists in Argentina.  Interest rates fall and rise respectively to
balance demand and supply in the financial markets.  Large outflows reflected in rising interest
rates may precipitate a severe recession, witness the current plight of Hong Kong, which al.;o
operates a currency board.
When there are runs on banks under a strict currency board system, the monetary
authorities cannot print open-ended amounts of money to support depositors.  Only funded
deposit insurance is feasible, possibly supported by government borrowing, but not by monoy
creation.  When funded schemes turn out to be insufficient to handle a bank run, then depos Ltors
lose their money.  Estonia accepted this tough consequence of adopting a currency board in
1992.
To guard against this extreme and politically unpalatable consequence, the financial
systems of countries with currency boards require tough and effective regulation and supenrision
of financial institutions.  Thlis  includes capital requirements for financial institutions in the (urcer
of 15 to 25 per cent much higher than the current international standards and reminiscent of the
capital levels of relatively unregulated free banking systems of the 18th and  19th century.
6 Other  countries  that have  adopted  currency  boards during  the 1  990s include  Bulgaria,  Estonia  and Lithuania. The
West  African  countries  of the CFA zone  maintained  their currency  board-like  system  after a one-off devaluatio  n
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Given the very tough discipline a currency board imposes, only countries that have a
history of failed internal reform attempts are tempted to consider this solution. Among them
only those who are honest enough to recognise their vulnerability to temptation are prepared to
introduce the system.  In a sense the club of currency board countries are akin to members of
Alcoholics Anonymous, aware of their weakness but determined to change their future.
Arguably, this also characterises the attitude of countries like Greece and Italy vis-a-vis currency
union in Europe.
Not only can countries import the credibility of other monetary authorities; they can also
import the strength of foreign financial institutions and to some degree the quality of foreign
bank regulation and supervision. New Zealand and again Argentina are relying heavily on
foreign branch banking.  This shifts at least some of the burden of supervision and re-
capitalisation to foreign entities allowing countries to economise on limited domestic capability.
Again, it takes a special political attitude to allow foreigners to "dominate" the domestic
financial system.
Quite a number of financial market observers and participants have been very surprised
by governments adopting tough disciplines like those of a currency board.  Ten years ago, the
consensus was that a currency board was not an idea whose time had come, that it was, if
anything, an outdated colonial scheme and that its time might never come back.  Today analysts
continue to be surprised by countries considering steps such a fall dollarisation.  The source of
much surprise is that tying politicians' hands reduces economically valuable flexibility and can
expose a country to severe recessionary forces in case of large currency outflows.
Yet, flexibility is a double-edged sword.  In countries, where elites have an interest in
collecting inflation tax while being able to avoid it by way of capital flight, there is a potential
citizens' constituency for severe limits on government discretion even if it means foregoing
potentially valuable flexibility.  For the same reason there can be constituencies for allowing
foreigners to control the financial system, because they are more likely to operate at arms-length
from political forces and interest groups that are behind past excesses.  The issue for the future is
whether these constituencies are likely to be strengthened.
III.  Exporting financial transactions
The ability of capital to move across national borders and find protection from inflation
tax in other countries has taken away power from monetary authorities. Many monetary
authorities can no longer raise significant inflation tax.'  This reduces the potential private
benefits that less than benevolent political forces can extract from controlling the monopoly issue
of domestic money. A monetary system without discipline will see massive capital flight and
collapse.  The only lasting choice is between a disciplined independent central bank that retains
some flexibility with a floating currency or a currency board or currency union that imposes
crude but effective discipline. Establishing sound checks and balances at home is hard for many
countries. Hence the growing attraction of currency boards.
7 For  the impact of e-money introduction on the ability of central banks to obtain seigneorage see BIS (1996).12  Money, Politics and a Future for the International Financial System
The advent of low-cost, secure electronic cross-border settlement systems will broaden
the scope for capital flight.  For countries with limited exchange controls e-money will make
capital flight an option even for poor citizens in remote areas.  Where capital controls remain
stringent e-money will widen the scope for evading controls for more and more people, simply
because it makes transactio:ns  cheaper and allows many to be conducted abroad.
Advances in information technology also underpin the emergence of real time gross
settlement systems.  When payments are settled in real time and without netting out exposure,
payment risk is minimised.  The traditional vulnerability of the payment system is reduced and
with it the risk of systemic crisis.  In fact, with the advent of e-money systems it may be that
banks no longer are essential for managing the payment system.  Bank regulation would thus
lose importance.
Today smart debit cards are being introduced in African countries to improve payment
for telephone and electric services. Wireless communication devices are starting to reach
millions of people in the poorest countries, for example pagers in China.  Twenty-five years from
now most of the world's population may well have access to global wireless communication
services and to smart debit cards.
Today financial transactions are routinely conducted via remote communication systems
such as the telephone or internet in a number of countries, for example Finland and the United
States.  Settlement costs per unit of transaction are set to decline.  Swedbank estimates that the
costs of transactions fall by two  orders of magnitude when passing from traditional cash
settlement to internet settlement. 8 Twenty-five years from now settlement costs may be so low
that moving from one currency to another can be virtually transaction cost free for ordinary
citizens - regulators willing.
Today on the intemeit, e-commerce and e-cash companies promote the use of electro nic
settlement systems. People all over the world can today buy physical products like books frT:ni
e-commerce companies like Amazon.com.  One e-commerce platform allows sellers of prod  ucts
or services to price their wares in any one of 100 currencies and promises to accept payment in
anyone of 16 currencies. 9 Tventy-five years from now anybody can shop in virtual stores, vhere
wares denominated in multipsle  currencies are offered. Bills can be settled by using financial~
balances held in a jurisdiction of one's choice in a currency of one's choice.
And so in 2025 Raul Sosa, imaginary citizen of Recife, Brazil, will go to his corner slicp
to buy a glass of Maracuja juice paying the vendor in dollars and settle under Cayman Island
jurisdiction.  De facto, citizens can then chose to some degree which currency regime to ope: ate
in and what kind of exchange rate risk to assume.  In this world, undisciplined financial syst mis
implode quickly or do not develop.  The relative strength of constituencies that favour tight
disciplines on powerful peop le rises.
8 Swedbank presentation at Santa Fe Institute conference on March, 27 and 28 1998 in London.
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IV.  Nation states as a system of liability limitation
The world system of nation states, combined with technology that allows cheap cross-
border transactions, provides a liability limitation mechanism for financial sector policy.  On the
one hand nation states want to conduct exchanges with each other.  On the other hand they have
rather limited concern for another state's citizens and likewise for another state's elite.  They are
thus willing to do what it takes to maintain some level of mutually beneficial exchange, while
remaining reluctant to bail out other nations and their subjects. For example, the United States
cannot prevent any nation from adopting the dollar. But as has been made abundantly clear
recently in response to Argentine interest in negotiating a monetary union, the United States
government and the Federal Reserve are not willing to assume responsibilities of lender of last
resort for foreign nations.
In this world of nation states big ideas about remaking new international financial
architecture in the image of best practice at home are hard to implement.  A credible
international lender of last resort would need resources backed by taxpayers in rich countries far
larger than those currently available to the IMF.  The provision of significantly more funds
would need to go together with a new system of regulatory standards for those benefiting from
access to the lender of last resort and with effective cross-border supervision and enforcement of
those rules.  Workout and bankruptcy systems would need to function in case of cross-border
disputes.  Foreign lenders would need to be able to attach assets and manage them or dispose of
them.  Enforcement has to be effective even when those in default are politically powerful in
their country and when the local judicial and law enforcement system is weak.  Without such
discipline, it would be imprudent to fund a huge lender of last resort system.
Nation states are not likely to write open checks for others nor are they likely to let others
run parts of their judiciary and law enforcement system.  Ultimately this may be a blessing in
disguise, because, if the nations of the world established a single monetary and financial system,
reform discipline might evaporate. The system of nation states is currently the ultimate political
mechanism providing arms-length "commitment technology" that can be exploited by growing
constituencies for greater discipline.
The driver for reform in the system of nation states will remain financial crises, a crude
form of discipline, but bereft of regulatory forbearance.  Tough banking disciplines and greater
disclosure can help underpin countries' attempts to improve their reputation and avoid sudden
currency crises.  When they see the value of good reputation for both the sovereign and private
legal entities, they may develop a taste for subjecting themselves to more independent scrutiny,
for example by adhering to a club allowing cross-border supervision.  The international
community can support the formation of a better global financial system.  BIS, IMF and World
Bank, they all try to contribute by developing better standards, by spreading the word about best
practice and by prodding countries in crises to adopt sound reforms. 10
However, ultimately the incentive for countries to adopt better policies lies in their
expectations that adoption gives them better access to financial markets and savings from
"' For a review of current initiative see IMF website at http://www.imf.org, particularly the reports to the G22 on the
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abroad."  It depends on whether they value such access.  This very same mechanism i.e. the
expectation of future access to finance has historically underpinned the evolution of credit (trust)
in unregulated markets, whether in the early systems of credit in medieval Europe (Milgrom,
North and Weingast, 1990 and Greif, 1997) or the loan sharking business. Government imposed
discipline may enhance the mechanism, but may not function well at all without it - for all the
reasons behind the "dilemmna  of regulation".  It thus appears that the much feared merciless
discipline of international finance requires an underlying political mechanism, in this case the
system of arms-length nation states, to function.
V.  The optimal currency zone issue
Of course, the scepltics  about the brave new world of discipline with proliferating
currency boards and currency unions are right. The loss of exchange rate flexibility will create
serious economic adjustment problems for many countries. The fundamental issue is that many
important prices, for example wages, land and house prices often do not adjust well to negative
economic shocks.  When a country is hit by a loss of demand for its products or a fall in their
price it requires a "real" devaluation, i.e. a reduction in the prices of non-tradable items like
labour and land relative to tradable goods and services like cars and food.  Consider Hong Kong
today. If nominal wages were more flexible downward, Hong Kong might not need such a
severe recession.  Countries that have flexible exchange rates can quickly lower everybody's
wages by letting the nominal exchange rate depreciate.  Once the prices of non-tradables have
adjusted, the country can grow again, as its products can now be produced sufficiently cheaply to
fmd buyers again.
Will these adjustment problems thwart the process towards fewer and larger currency
zones with appended currency boards?  Economists have developed the concept of "optimal
currency" zone.  Consider 1'exas' plight in 1986. The drastic drop in oil prices required a real
devaluation in Texas. House prices fell, wages weakened.  But Texas is part of a large coukitry,
in which citizens can and do move around freely and frequently.  Rather than accepting lov;
wages, employees could chose to move elsewhere in search of new reasonably paid jobs.  Cwu-
of-state ("foreign") financial institutions ended up buying up failed banks and re-capitalisecI
them.  Fiscal transfers within the United States helped cushioning the blow to Texas' financ es.
The optimal currency zone concept says that currency zones will be easiest to sustain if ther  e is
substantial labour mobility and a system allowing financial flows into distressed areas to cu ,hion
the fall-out from negative shocks.
Now consider the fo]llowing  eight countries: Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexicc
Nigeria, Pakistan and Russia.  About half the world's population lives in them. None of these
countries could easily be characterised as an optimal currency zone.  Labour mobility in sormie  of
them is heavily restricted.  I'he new EURO area is hardly optimal given the stark difference, in
economic positions of, say I reland, the eastern parts of Germany and Sicily and the low de falcto
mobility of citizens across borders.  If we add up the population in the eight large countries
above plus currency unions such as the EURO and the West African CFA area plus currenc,
"Note also that  currently  the IMF, for example,  helps  countries cope with financial market discipline, but it does
not establish a fundamentally different discipline, but depends for its effectiveness on that of the financial markets.15  Money, Politics and a Future for the International Financial System
board and dollarised countries, we find that two thirds of humanity live in sub-optimal currency
areas. This assumes that the United States and Japan are such optimal zones.
Sub-optimal currency areas can obviously be sustained as long as they are embedded in a
single political system or as long as the population sees them as the lesser evil compared to no
discipline at all.  Some improvement of the flexibility of product, labour and land markets is
anyway required for an effective financial system and progress on that front will moderate
problems arising in sub-optimal currency areas. Moreover, strong product and factor market
competition is likely to sustain rapid productivity growth, particularly in countries catching up
with world best practice.  Rapid productivity growth in turn may help reduce the depth of
financial crises.  In fact, EMU is interpreted by some as a device forcing member governments to
embark on serious product and labour market reform.
VI.  Money Unbundled
Competing units of account.  Nevertheless flexibility is valuable.  Yet, there may be
other ways to obtain it than to preserve the national currency. The issue is to find a way of
denominating wages - and other prices that adjust sluggishly to negative shocks - in a "currency"
that is positively correlated with the shock. For example, there are those, who argue that Russia
should have pegged its currency to the Australian dollar.  As the Australian dollar reflects to
some extent the commodity export dependence of Australia, Russia as another commodity
producer would find a natural hedge in the Australian dollar.
The issue can be restated as follows. In doing so, it is useful to recall the three basic
functions of money, namely "store of value", "means of payment" and "unit of account".  The
optimal currency argument sees special value in having different units of account denominate the
value of goods or services which feature prices that adjust sluggishly, particularly downwards,
for example wages.  An adjustment in the unit of account can then effect a relative price
adjustment that may be required following some shock, for example the oil price drop in the case
of Texas, in a more efficient way than relying on, say, wage re-negotiations.  From this
perspective, all those markets would benefit from having their very own unit of account, where
prices adjust badly. The ideal world thus has different units of account.  As different shocks tend
to hit different sectors of activity within a country, ideally, it would be possible to denominate
prices in specific currencies suited to a specific economic activity.  The use of different units of
account may be an acceptable way for everybody to fool themselves into nominal and real price
flexibility, just as adjustable nominal exchange rates are.
This is possible in principle. After all, money is debt of a central bank.12 One could use
debt of other entities to denominate the wages of employees in a particular industry, for example
that of highly rated corporations, which tend to be better rated than most monetary authorities of
this world anyway.  For any specific industry one could also create a mutual fund that holds a
representative basket of debt issued by well-rated corporations operating in the industry.  The
12 Domestic currency is truly like central bank debt, where currency is fully backed by "serious" assets, like strong
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fund could then in turn issue bonds, the value of which adjusts with industry conditions.
Employees could be paid wages, the value of which fluctuates with the value of these bonds.
Why would any self-respecting employee agree to such a scheme?  In the past the very
issue of varying the currency, in which wages are denominated, has not arisen very often except
maybe in compensation and retirement packages for expatriate employees of multinational
organisations.  In the future, it is more likely to be a topic of debate (see the U.K example
discussed below).  Once it is a topic for debate, it will become clear that currency choice has
some risk-sharing properties, which are after all of potential interest to both employers and
employees.  First, today more and more firms pay all sorts of employees with shares or stock
options.  The risks of being paid wages denominated in "industry bonds" are less than with such
firm-specific remuneration.  Second, the employee thus paid is exposed to currency risk, i.e. the
exchange rate of the bond to the currency used as unit of account for purchases of goods and
services.  However, that currency risk is offset to some degree by a lower risk of becoming
unemployed for those who accept wages that move with industry profitability.  Lower risk of
unemployment may make both the employee and the firm a better credit risk to lenders.
Depending on individual preferences people might prefer to have their salaries denominated in
varying proportions in shares, bonds and "regular" currency.
The principle is illustrated by a current debate in the United Kingdom.  As of this year
U.K. companies have the option to keep their accounts in EURO, be taxed on those accounts,
pay taxes in EUTROs  and conduct financial operations in EUROs.  Some large U.K. companies
are currently considering whether to pay certain classes of employees in EUROs.  Some trade
unions are said to favour this. Payment in EUROs would make it easier for employees to get
EURO denominated long-term mortgages, which are currently still cheaper than the typical
floating rate mortgage in the U.K.  The switch to EUROs would thus de facto act in the first
round like a salary increase for many employees.  Choosing a different currency makes the
employee a better credit risk for some purposes and may be the preferred option.
The basic principle is also very much at work in today's Russia, where barter is widel-ly
used for wholesale transactions.  In recent years in Russia, credit constraints on banks have dhied
up trade credit for many firrns. Barter is substituting for normal trade credit issued by bank!;.
Essentially, a supplier paid in goods extends credit to the buyer, because it takes time to sell the
goods and obtain money.  For the period it takes to do so the supplier actually extends a typeo  of
credit.  Alternatively firms could pay suppliers with IOUs.  However, their value is hard to
assess, whereas barter goods provide better credit backing and by now fairly well functioniiig
barter exchanges have formed that provide the market with essential liquidity (Commander  3md
Mumssen, 1999). In addition, accounting rules imposed by the tax authorities on companie
limit the freedom of companies to adjust prices denominated in roubles downward, ostensib .y to
prevent tax evasion.  However, many goods produced in markets with weak demand require
price discounting to establish a reasonable balance between demand and supply.  Denominal irg
prices in goods provides a more flexible unit of account than the rouble to effect downward price
adjustment (Oxford Analytica, 1998).
In sum, advocates of optimal currency zones and thus flexible exchange rate regimes de
facto assume that multiple Wuits  of account are desirable.  There is no reason to believe that
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account.  Units of account, tailored to reflect varying conditions even within countries, can
potentially improve on national ones.  For example if workers in the manufacturing industries of
the British Midlands can only with great difficulty find jobs in London's service industry, then
workers in those two labour markets would benefit from different units of account.  Through the
rise of cross-border e-commerce we also have to face the issue of how to denominate products
offered in this way.  If, for example, certain types of items sold by one e-commerce provider tend
to be preferred by certain types of customer classes it may provide competitive advantage to the
seller to (partially) denominate their value in a "currency" reflecting those that are used to pay
the typical customer.  The advocates of optimal currency zones should really add free choice of
the unit of account to their desired policy goals.  In line with standard economic arguments,
greater choice should, if anything, improve outcomes.
Competing means ofpayment.  Wages could thus be usefully denominated using special
units of account, which are positively correlated with industry conditions. However, employees
may actually be paid in more liquid instruments.  Current exchange rates would then be used to
establish the amount of those liquid means of payment required to meet contractually agreed
wages.  Such features of contracts separating the unit of account from the means of payments for
wages or pensions can today be found in expatriate remuneration packages.  Some e-cornmerce
providers allow customers a choice of currencies to be used for payment.  Today some stores in
London accept payment in up to eleven currencies.
It is obvious why people would prefer another currency to their national one in many
countries. After all the use of the dollar, in particular, is widespread in many high-inflation
countries, where citizens do not trust national monetary authorities.  In fact, most monetary
authorities of the world have a lower credit rating than many strong international corporations
and citizens of those countries would surely prefer to use the debt of these corporations as money
to their own currency. However, as long as strong fiat currencies such as the US dollar exist, the
obvious choice is to stick with them.
People's preferences could really turn towards private money, if the credibility of the US
Fed and the European Central Bank was undermined.  This would reduce trust in the world's two
most prestigious currencies and it would signal strongly that even the safest havens might be
vulnerable.  In the past, citizens started switching out of the domestic currency in major ways
when inflation reached triple or high double-digit levels.  With very low costs of cross-border
settlements and sophisticated financial markets handling a variety of units of account capital
flight may become effective at much lower levels, say 10 per cent inflation or below.  One could,
for example, imagine that the US Federal Reserve would be tempted to support US equity
investors repeatedly after stock market crashes as it did in 1987. In time this could drive stock
market speculation to ever increasing heights, as investors expect to be helped by the Fed and the
Fed can not refuse to help ageing populations dependent on stock market performance for their
retirement.  The European Central Bank may yet succumb to pressures to inflate as European
unemployment continues to rise.  We might thus imagine that in Europe people might lose trust
in the new currency at the same time that they start using new units of account to improve real
wage flexibility.
In the light of these possibilities, competing issuers of money (as means of payment)
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As even currently prudenit and competent monetary authorities may at some point fall prey to the
incentive to issue excessive amounts of currency, it will always be good to have a number of
strong currencies around.
Citizens may then come to trust those currencies most that are backed by safe and liquid
assets, for example gold, oil or highly rated bonds of governments or corporations.  The issuer of
money backed in this way may well be a private party as has been the case in the free banking
systems of past days (or Russian Veksels in the 1990s). In a world of e-money a particular
challenge for private issuers may be how to establish trust in their currency.  In the past holders
of currency could take comnfort  in banks with big marble buildings that could not disappear over
night.  Big buildings, i.e. significant sunk costs, de facto acted as a commitment mechanism for
bank owners. In the future, maybe mining and oil companies could become credible issuers.  In
a sense, in the "weightless" economy issuers of money may need to be asset-based to establish
credibility.
The use of competing currencies as a means of payment has several historical examples
in times when payment technology was much more primitive.  In the l9 'h century United States
store clerks had large books providing guidance on which paper issued by competing banks to
accept and on the relevant discount. With electronic payment systems it will be even easier to
assess the value of a "currency" offered in payment, for example in real time at the store counter.
The functions of money, unit of account, means of payment and store of value can thus
be completely unbundled.  We can already use a vast array of assets to store value (stocks,
bonds, real estate, bank accounts, gold, antiques etc.). For the choice of store of value, return,
risk and diversification expectations guide the investor.  For the choice of unit of account trade-
offs between credit and exchange rate risk may guide contract design.  For the means of payment
liquidity considerations are key.
VII.  Conclusion
Thefinancial systew in 2025.  The scenario presented above assumes that current  ffiorts
to find a globally agreed framework for financial markets fail.  Likewise efforts to render
monetary authorities independent are assumed to fail over longer periods of time.  Meanwhile
the advent of low cost financial transaction technology effectively erases limits to trade in
financial instruments of whatever denomination.  As individuals, corporations and nations  ry to
grapple with the consequences we may start to see the emergence of a new global financial
system.
By 2025 key elements of the new system may already be in place.  In a number of
countries, where monetary discipline was too hard to introduce and where citizens took move and
more advantage of their capital flight option, currency systems have imploded.  In some of'tLese
countries governments turned to formal commitment mechanisms like currency boards or
unions." 3 In others, citizens routinely use "foreign" currencies to settle transactions.  The sr read
13  Both in currency unions and among "dollarised" zones balance of payments statistics become of less use.  A.s  iin
Hong Kong today, full balance of payments statistics may no longer be produced and thus may not forn  the basis of
macro-economic policy-making anymore.19  Money, Politics and a Future for the International Financial System
of new units of accounts to denominate non-tradables, wage contracts in particular, has largely
eliminated the pain from removing exchange rate flexibility. Only a few small countries still
have the credibility to retain strong domestic currencies and flexible exchange rate systems.
The EURO has lost credibility as the ECB gave in to political pressure to accommodate
uneven economic development in the European Union.  The EURO is used less and less to
denominate contracts.  Alternative means of payments, e.g. the dollar are circulating.  While the
dollar is still considered trustworthy, the experience with the EURO has made people wary.
Cross-currency transaction costs have plummeted. People have become used not only to store
their wealth in a multitude of assets but also to complex ways of denominating contracts.  They
thus find it comparatively easy to use varying means of payments to settle transactions.  Some
commodity-backed currencies are being used that also find favour with investors and as units of
account.
The first central bank was already privatised by the radical government of a successful
Central Asian republic in 2008.  A wave of such privatisations started around 2015.14 At the
same time governments have reshaped financial systems. Funded schemes to provide the
functions of lender of last resort and deposit insurance have been put in place - often backed by
the fiscal authorities.
Policy debate in 2025.  Regardless of whether one thinks that a world of currency
competition as described above is good or bad, governments may well be faced with a
significantly changed environment for policy-making.  And so it may be that in 2025 the biggest
topic of debate among monetary policy-makers on the globe is that of the consequences of
currency choice for citizens.
In that debate there are two underlying questions.
*  How will the services of lender of last resort be provided in a world of currency
competition?
*  Will this world not be subject to very high financial volatility and frequent crises as
demand for money is subject to self-fulfilling panics triggered by firms and people
becoming dissatisfied with the currency they currently use?
Advocates of currency competition will argue that private issuers of money have a good
incentive to preserve discipline, i.e. not print money in good times, because people will desert
their currency, if they print excessive amounts. During times of liquidity shortage, they will
have an incentive to issue more debt (money) at low rates advantageous to them.  They will also.
point out that people can always opt for one of the great currency blocks, which have clear old-
style lenders of last resort.
Sceptics will, of course, recognise this type of world as Friedrich Hayek dreamland,
where ultra-liberal fantasies come true that will in practice result in recurring financial turmoil.
They will argue that money demand for competing currencies will be highly unstable and thus
14 In many countries central banks may have given up targeting inflation rates, because the split between real and
nominal price changes can not be measured well enough in an economy, where quality changes and new products
render calculating inflation indices more and more meaningless.20  Money, Politics and a Futurefor  the International Financial System
price levels subject to significant fluctuations.  Such systems may be subject to frequent and
severe speculative attacks.  Rogue private money issuers may try to take advantage of trusting
citizens, who will have a hard time assessing the seriousness of private issuers.  The sceptics will
reply that well-regulated large monetary systems with lenders of last resort are superior because
they have the option of calning  panics and supporting depositors with open-ended deposit
insurance.
To which the advocates of competition will reply that in the absence of safety nets
citizens will monitor financial institutions better.  Those who want to get business will have to
advertise with verifiable de1tails  about their financial strength, just as Scottish banks in the early
19th century.  Funded deposit insurance and lenders of last resort are still possible, just not the
dangerous open-ended money printing machines of the 20th  century.  Market discipline wouldl
drive out weaknesses and leave very robust financial institutions and currencies.
And so we are back at the beginning.  Some trust the self-correcting forces of markets,
some fear panic and speculaLtors.  Some things never change.  But incentives to fix domestic
financial systems may well grow. Either regulatory systems get better or some degree of greater
currency choice in global financial markets will establish crude but ultimately effective
discipline.  The eternal tug-of-war between markets and regulators goes on - unsurprising to
students of politics.  They uaderstand that the dilemma of how to design systems that guard the
guardians, while providing llexibility, has no easy solutions.
Students of history will remember that the great leap forward to innovative modem
societies, the "European Miracle" (Jones, 1981), arose in the context of squabbling states and
principalities in medieval Europe, which gave choice to more and more citizens precisely
because they were not "well ordered".  Key to the secret of success were the natural checks and
balances arising from the combination of arms-length entities and sufficient permeability of
borders for ideas, people, trade and finance.  A world of nation states with borders open to
financial movements and currency choice might after all be well suited to support continued
social and technical innovation on earth, which in turn renders development more sustainabl] . In
the year 2025 as depicted in this essay, there is much debate about the costs and benefits of
competition among jurisdictions, be they nation states or other types, such as cities.21  Money, Politics and a Future for the International Financial System
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